INTRODUCTION
Through an example of a study utilizing the case-law research method, this paper critically assesses whether taking into account the findings of La Rue (the United Nations Rapporteur on Human Rights 1 ) website blocking could be implemented in a way which is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing 
As the ECtHR held in Times v UK: ''…the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information generally. The maintenance of Internet archives is a critical aspect of this role and the Court therefore considers that such archives fall within the ambit of the protection afforded by Article 10.''
DEA site blocking provisions. This section will critically assess whether sections 17 and 18 of the DEA respect the principles of predictability and transparency. According to the firstpart of the Special Rapporteur's cumulative test for any restriction upon the right to freedom of expression to be ''prescribed by law'' under Article 10(2) of the ECHR, the site blocking provisions should be drafted so that the provisions are clear and precise. 11 Jeremy Hunt asked
Ofcom to review the site blocking provisions. In particular, sections 17 and 18 of the DEA which give the Secretary of State the power to grant the courts the authority to compel service providers and other intermediaries, to block access to locations, which are suspected of being involved in copyright infringement. 12 However, due to the lack of predictability, transparency and foreseeability inherent in the latter power, this section shows how, regardless of being ''prescribed by law'' in view of the Opinion of the CJEU Advocate General Cruz Villalón in 13 it is arguable that the UK government's elimination of the site blocking provisions seems appropriate.
SABAM v Scarlet

The CJEU's guidance in L'oreal v eBay
To Notwithstanding, as the Court elaborates, the above measures, which are '' described (nonexhaustively) ' ' in addition to any other measure that could be ordered, need to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake.
16
Blocking injunctions in the UK
According to Ofcom's review, content holders in the UK already have two methods of ensuring blocking injunctions. Firstly, a court could grant an injunction compelling the alleged contravening party to immediately stop the infringing act. Secondly, they also have section 97A of the CDPA. 17 However, since under the CDPA the injunction may only be granted when an infringement has already taken place Ofcom's review notes that section 97A seems to be less suitable for ensuring injunctions than the DEA. 18 As stated in section 17 of the DEA:
"(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the granting by a court of a blocking injunction in respect of a location on the internet which the court is satisfied has been, is being or is likely to be used for or in connection with an activity that infringes copyright. (2) 'Blocking injunction' means an injunction that requires a service provider to prevent its
service being used to gain access to the location."
19
In Europe there has been a significant increase in the number of decisions where the problems associated with blocking injunctions have been addressed. 20 Nevertheless, taking into account the findings of the CJEU in SABAM v Scarlet 21 and SABAM v Netlog 22 none of those cases appears to recognise the human rights issues raised by these orders to any greater extent than the British Fox v BT 23 .
Definition of location, service provider and information society service
Notably, in Fox v BT the claimants contend that section 17 of the DEA differentiates between the location that is employed to contravene copyright, and the service provider's facility that is employed to access the location utilized to contravene copyright.
24
Although not mentioned in Fox v BT it is worth noting that Ofcom's review understands location as being any host connected to the internet that can connect and transmit data to another web host. 25 However, in light of the analysis of whether consistent with the first-part of the Special
Rapporteur's cumulative test the site blocking provisions are ''prescribed by law'' under article 10(2) of the ECHR attention should be paid to the below definitions.
The explanatory notes to the DEA assert that a service provider is one relating to provision of an information society service. Moreover, an information society service is ''broadly defined'' as any facility ''normally'' supplied for remuneration at a distance through electronic equipment. Interestingly, instances of these not only include ISPs but also site providers, such as, cyberlockers.
26
Sections 17 and 18 v section 97A
On the other hand, of particular relevance is that pursuant to Ofcom's review the site blocking provisions introduce a scheme for injunctions that is ''much broader'' than section 97A of the CDPA. For example, under the latter a service provider needs to have actual knowledge of information about an individual employing their facility to contravene copyright. However, Ofcom notes, the knowledge or lack thereof under section 17 of the DEA is irrelevant.
27
As Ofcom's review explains, the important determinant is thus whether the site "has been, is being or is likely to be used for or in connection with" copyright infringement. 
Problems
Incompatibility with the first-part of the Special Rapporteur's cumulative test
This section has examined whether the power to make provision about injunctions preventing access to internet locations could possibly be consistent with the first-part of the Special
Rapporteur's cumulative test. There is a legal rationale for permitting interference that stems from sections 17 and 18 of the DEA. However, the first major finding of this paper is that 
BLOCKING MEASURES UNDER THE SECOND-PART OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR'S CUMULATIVE TEST
The second matter to be examined in this paper is whether conforming to the second-part of the Special Rapporteur's cumulative test the DEA site blocking provisions comply with the principle of legitimacy. 61 In Fox v BT Arnold J finds that the studios copyrights are "rights of others" within the meaning of article 10(2) of the ECHR. 62 However, as he notes, in Fox v Newzbin 63 Kitchin J is not referred to any relevant laws and jurisprudence, which directly affect human rights. Thus, where the court becomes aware of evidence that the Convention rights of content holders other than the participants to a copyright dispute are compromised, according to Arnold J it is not simply empowered, but ''obliged'', to respect them. 64 As will be discussed, in light of the CJEU SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog for any limitation to freedom of expression to ''protect the rights of others'' content holders' rights need to be fairly balanced against those of ISPs, site operators and users. 65 Therefore, in contrast with Arnold J's finding this section will show why the UK government's rejection of sections 17
and 18 of the DEA seems appropriate. Indeed, this is particularly true when perfectly legitimate online speech, like employing a site with no intention of infringing upon copyright needs to be censored by the High Court but could possibly be found illegitimate by both the second-part of the Special Rapporteur's cumulative test and the CJEU's case-law.
The studios' interest in Newzbin2
To begin with, in Fox v BT pursuant to Arnold J movies and TV shows make up about 70% of the available content through Newzbin2 whilst approximately 30% of that content comprises different types of material.
66
Yet though the studios control the copyrights to many movies and TV shows distributed by
Newzbin2, he notes that it is evident that other content owners are likewise ''substantially affected'' by it.
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Of particular relevance here, however, is that the respondent claims that it would be inappropriate to grant an injunction that goes beyond the repertoire where the studios hold rights, and to compel BT to block its users from accessing any element of Newzbin2 for any purpose. 68 In particular, in support of the above BT gathers evidence from two decisions -CPI v Robinson 69 and Fox v Newzbin 70 . 
CPI v Robinson
72
Although not mentioned in Fox v BT in deciding whether to grant an injunction section 17 of the DEA states that the court needs to take account of any proof of steps taken by the content holder, or by a licensee 73 and "copyright owner" has to be understood as in the CDPA.
74
Yet in Fox v BT the High Court is convinced that the above decision does not answer whether an injunction should be granted, but instead the scope of the injunction. 75 is non-infringing 118 , no court should ever be allowed to restrict upon the notion of striking a fair balance between copyright holders' interests and those of ISPs, site operators and users.
Thus it is easy to justify why in conforming to Ofcom's review the removal by the UK government of the DEA's ability to block artistic content on the web seems appropriate.
However, as will be discussed next, in order to solve the above unresolved problem consistent with the third-part of the Special Rapporteur's cumulative test, the real question is whether the power to make provision about injunctions preventing access to internet locations complies with the principles of necessity and proportionality. 
BLOCKING MEASURES UNDER THE THIRD-PART OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR'S CUMULATIVE TEST
In line with the third-part of the Special Rapporteur's cumulative test the next issue to be considered is whether the site blocking provisions conform to the principles of necessity and proportionality. 120 Ofcom's review notes that under the DEA, content holders expect the legal system to result in injunctions coming into operation within hours after an application being made. This demonstrates the concern that they have over the sudden loss of value from unlawfully streaming live content and from the urgent need to restrict access to pre-release material. 121 However, as Ofcom elaborates, due to the speed at which site operators adopt bypass mechanisms a long period between an application being approved and a block being performed decreases the effectiveness of the site blocking provisions. Accordingly, Arnold J turns to the evaluation of the effectiveness and proportionality of the order.
Effectiveness of the order sought
On one hand, in Fox v BT the evidence demonstrates that the operators of Newzbin2 have ''at least two'' circumvention tools to allow users to bypass BT's block. 136 However, in view of the analysis of whether the site blocking provisions comply with the Special Rapporteur's principles of necessity and proportionality it is important to note Arnold J's next finding.
According to the High Court, it is neither necessary nor adequate to describe these bypass mechanisms in any detail. 137 As Arnold J observes, injunctive relief may be effectively granted for, inter alia, the following reasons.
First, it appears probable that circumvention will compel most users to gain additional expertise. That said in Fox v BT the ISP claims that the injunction should require the studios to notify specific URLs regarding the specific NZBs files catalogued by Newzbin2 that correspond to unauthorized copies of specific copyright compositions. 150 However, as this order requires the studios to spend a great deal of time, effort, and money in passing large URL records to BT daily, Arnold J finds that it ''would not be proportionate''.
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Overall, consistent with the third-part of the Special Rapporteur's cumulative test, the factors to be considered when assessing the necessity and proportionality of blocking provisions include their effectiveness, severity and procedural fairness. 152 As shown below, in light of well-established CJEU case-law it is submitted that their rejection by the UK government seems fair.
Effectiveness of the site blocking provisions
Firstly, the main problem of Fox v BT is that rather than following the expert evidence according to Arnold J the order sought is considered to be an effective relief. For example, in paragraph 192 the evidence demonstrates that the operators of Newzbin2 have ''at least two'' ways of enabling users to circumvent BT's block. 153 However, the High Court held that it is not necessary or adequate grounds to examine the likely effectiveness of these bypass mechanisms. 
158
Severity of the site blocking provisions
Secondly, in Fox v BT the High Court also finds that it is ''necessary'' and ''proportionate'' to grant injunctive relief as the Article 1 First Protocol rights of the studios clearly override the Article 10 rights of BT and those of users and operators of Newzbin2. 159 However, the regrettable fact remains that again Arnold J provides no evidence which can be relied upon to support his claim. 
As the Strasbourg organs held in
164
A less invasive alternative than the site blocking provisions
Thirdly, another problem that arises in Fox v BT is that BT disputes that the injunction should compel the studios to notify them of all URLs that relate to the specific NZB files listed by
Newzbin2 that correspond to unauthorized copies of specific copyright compositions. 165 However, Arnold J finds such an order to be disproportionate or impracticable since it would oblige the Studios to devote considerable effort and resources in notifying extensive catalogues of URLs to BT daily. ''proportionate'' to block it. 171 However, given the ineffectiveness of blocking measures, their impact on Article 10 Convention rights and the studios' ability to minimally intrude on free speech, the third major finding of this paper is that sections 17 and 18 of the DEA might possibly be incompatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Indeed, all the more so since according to the CJEU L'oreal v eBay injunctions must be ''effective'', ''dissuasive'' and ''proportionate'', and cannot lead to barriers to lawful trade. 172 Thus, another significant practical implication that arises from this section is that again the UK could be at odds with European case-law. It is therefore understandable why, in assessing the necessity and proportionality of the site blocking provisions Ofcom's review recommends that they are removed. 173 However, as discussed in the following section, under Article 10(2) of the ECHR taking into account the findings of Section I, Section II and Section III, the last important area of consideration will be to assess whether the implementation of content blocking systems like Cleanfeed is compliant with the CJEU case-law. Therefore, the second lesson that can be learnt from this paper is that for content blocking systems like Cleanfeed to conform to the CJEU's case-law they should also be designed taking into account the fundamental freedoms of the ISP's clients. Resultantly, the third lesson that can be learnt from this paper is that for Cleanfeed's implementation not to result in general monitoring being performed again, these filters should arguably be created to evade ''active observation'' of content.
THE LEGALITY OF CONTENT BLOCKING SYSTEMS FROM THE CJEU PERSPECTIVE
Carrying out general monitoring
Blocking measures inconsistency with article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31
This section has analysed whether in light of the CJEU case-law the power to make provision about injunctions preventing access to internet locations strikes the right balance between the interests of copyright holders and those of ISPs, site operators and users. In Fox v BT Arnold J finds that the order sought by the studios does not require BT to perform active monitoring but merely to block Newzbin2. 225 However, as the CJEU in SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog suggests, irrespective of how specifically monitoring is carried out, no shallow packet inspection device will ever be able to distinguish in an absolutely foolproof way between licensed and unlicensed content. 226 Thus one of the most significant findings to emerge from this paper is that under Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC the implementation of content blocking systems like Cleanfeed is certainly likely to result in a prohibited act, namely, carrying out general monitoring. Consequently, another significant practical implication of this section is that in view of SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog once more the UK could be in breach of European case-law. Therefore, no matter how sections 17 and 18 of the DEA are implemented, the main conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that pursuant to the CJEU's jurisprudence the blocking of legitimate speech would fail to strike the right balance between the interests of content owners and those of ISPs, site operators and users.
OBSERVATIONS
Leaving aside the original contribution that this paper adds to the creation of new knowledge regarding the compatibility of any blocking measure with article 10 of the ECHR, the major weakness inherent in this study concerns the method of data collection.
As discussed in the introduction, in February 2011, Jeremy Hunt asked Ofcom to assess whether sections 17 and 18 of the DEA could be effectively implemented. Notwithstanding, in May 2011, Ofcom concluded that the site blocking provisions would be ineffective.
227
Therefore, following Ofcom's review this paper demonstrates why the UK's government's decision to abandon site-blocking plans appears appropriate. However, apart from judicial decisions, legislation, administrative law and independent expert evidence this study provides virtually no other relevant information to reach such a conclusion.
As Max Rowlands notes, Hunt's decision generated optimism among some detractors of the of the DEA without enraging the copyright industry which has exerted strong pressure for its introduction. 230 However, whether the UK government's decision will eventually result in such contentious provisions being removed from the DEA remains to be seen. Consequently, although most of the findings presented in this paper are robust, the ones in support of the UK government's decision to abandon site-blocking plans are at best disputable, and at worst no longer sustainable. 
